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Accounting for Differences among Patients in the FDA Approval Process
Anup Malani, Oliver Bembom and Mark van der Laan1

Abstract. The FDA employs an average-patient standard when reviewing drugs: it
approves a drug only if the average patient (in clinical trials) does better on the drug than on
control. It is common, however, for different patients to respond differently to a drug.
Therefore, the average-patient standard can result in approval of a drug with significant negative
effects for certain patient subgroups (false positives) and disapproval of drugs with significant
positive effects for other patient subgroups (false negatives). Drug companies have a financial
incentive to avoid false negatives. After their clinical trials reveal that their drug does not benefit
the average patient, they conduct what is called post hoc subgroup analysis to highlight patients
that benefit from the drug. The FDA rejects such analysis due to the risk of spurious results.
With enough data dredging, a drug company can always find some patients that benefit from
their drug.
This paper asks whether there workable compromise between the FDA and drug
companies. Specifically, we seek a drug approval process that can use post hoc subgroup
analysis to eliminate false negatives but does not risk opportunistic behavior and spurious
correlation. We recommend that the FDA or some other independent agent conduct subgroup
analysis to identify patient subgroups that may benefit from a drug. Moreover, we suggest a
number of statistical algorithms that operate as veil of ignorance rules to ensure that the
independent agent is not indirectly captured by drug companies. We illustrate our proposal by
applying it to the results of a recent clinical trial of a cancer drug (motexafin gadolinium) that
was recently rejected by the FDA.
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Introduction
Different people respond differently to drugs. Statisticians refer to this as heterogeneity
in treatment response. For example, Anthrotec (Pfizer) is an effective treatment for osteoarthritis
for patients who develop ulcers when certain common pain medications.2 But a key ingredient in
Anthrotec – misoprostol – is documented to induce labor and used for medical elective abortion.3
Therefore, while Anthrotec is generally effective for pain relief, it is contraindicated4 for
pregnant women because of its abortifacient effects.
Or consider the case of motexafin gadolinium (MGd), a treatment for lung cancer patients
experiencing mental illness because the cancer has spread to – or metastasized in – their brain.
In a Phase III trial, the average patient did not experience a statistically significant benefit from
the drug.5 This failure is driven by poor results among patients who had already taken
chemotherapy for their cancer.6 Among the patients who were newly diagnosed and had not yet
received any chemotherapy, however, the drug appears to more than double the median time
before the onset of dementia.7
Under current regulations, however, the U.S. Food and Drug Agency (FDA) typically
considers only the effect of a drug in the average patient when deciding whether to approve the
drug. Given heterogeneity in treatment response, this approach can result in the approval of
drugs with significant negative effects for identifiable subgroups of patent (false positives) and in
the non-approval of drugs with significant positive effects for identifiable subgroups (false
negatives).
The FDA is not entirely deaf to these concerns. To address false positives, the FDA may
perform (or require the drug sponsor8 to perform) so-called post hoc subgroup analysis to
identify subgroups that do not benefit or that suffer severe side effects from an otherwise
2

Anthrotec is diclofenac sodium plus misoprostol. Osteoarthritis is pain and inflammation caused by the breakdown
of cartilage in a patient’s joints. The pain medications that cause ulcers are non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAIDs).
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See Goldberg et al., Misoprostol and Pregnancy, 34(1) New Eng. J. Med. 38 (Jan. 4, 2001).
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Arthrotec product insert at 1, available at FDA, Label and Approval History – Arthrotec, Labeling revision, Aug.
24, 2007 (http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2007/020607s010lbl.pdf) (checked Mar. 7, 2008).
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Statistical significance is conventionally defined as having a p-value less than or equal to 0.05.
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Their tumors tended to be more resilient as they had already survived previous treatment.
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This result is statistically significant, with a p-value less than 0.002. See infra Section 4a.
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Any organization conducting clinical trials in order to obtain marketing approval for a drug is called a drug
sponsor. A drug company may be a sponsor, but not all sponsors must be drug companies. For example, a nonprofit organization such as a University may seek marketing approval for a drug.
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approved drug. Subgroup analysis is statistical evaluation of the effect of a drug on one or more
subgroups of the subjects in a clinical trial. Post hoc subgroup analysis, in particular, is the
estimation of treatment effects in subgroups that were not specified prior to the start of the trial.
Instead the statistical analysis is performed on subgroups identified from the data after the trial
had begun or was completed. The FDA may use the results from this post hoc subgroup analysis
to justify a label that indicates that the drug is inappropriate for the subgroups it identifies.
To address false negatives, the FDA does two things. First, it allows a drug sponsor to
specify, before a trial, one or more subsets of the targeted patient population for which it plans to
undertake subgroup analysis. In many cases, however, the sponsor may not have enough
information prior to trials to identify subgroups that may be especially sensitive to treatment.
Even if it did, the FDA would require the sponsor to increase sample size so that its study gathers
sufficient statistical information – or “power” – to accurately estimate treatment effects in those
subgroups.9 This additional cost may outstrip the financial resources available to many sponsors.
Second, the sponsor may conduct post hoc subgroup analysis following a trial that is not
powered for that analysis and ask the FDA for permission to conduct a follow-up trial on a
possibly sensitive subgroup identified in the post hoc analysis. But this approach adds the
expense of a full additional trial to the cost of clinical testing.
Although drug sponsors complain that the FDA’s position imposes too high a cost on
exploiting heterogeneity in treatment response, the agency’s approach has a rational foundation.
Post hoc subgroup analysis increases the risk of approving drugs that have no net beneficial
effect. The more subgroups the sponsor analyzes, the more likely it is to find one that appears to
benefit even if in fact there exists no subgroup that benefits. We call this problem the risk of
spurious correlation from “multiple testing”. The sponsor has a financial incentive to ignore –
and perhaps increase – this risk. After all, they have already invested millions in lab research
and clinical testing; if the drug is not approved they will obtain no return on this investment. If
9

The basic formula for how large the sample in each subgroup must be to ascertain a treatment effect is
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/ . In this formula, is how sensitive the researcher wants the estimate to be. In other words,
/
the formula gives the sample size required to identify treatment effects that are at least as large as . The formula
also depends on , the variance of the treatment effect from the drug. The larger the variance, the more the noise in
the data and thus the larger the sample size required to identify a treatment effect as small as . Usually the
researcher estimates from previous studies of the drug or the disease. The crucial statistical parameters are / ,
which determines defines the confidence level of the analysis, and , which determines the power of the analysis.
The higher is the confidence level of the analysis, the lower is the chance of a false positive. A confidence level of
95% (i.e.,
0.05) means that the probability that a significant result is false is just 5%. The critical value for this
level of confidence in a two-sided test with a normal distribution is /
1.96. The higher is the power of an
analysis, the lower is the chance of a false negative. A power level of 80% (
0.8) means that the probability that
a drug with a positive treatment effect is mistakenly reported as having an insignificant treatment effect is 20%. The
0.842. As is apparent from the formula, greater higher confidence
critical value for this level of power is
levels and power require larger sample size.
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the FDA knew the number of subgroups the sponsor sampled in search of a positive response the
FDA could limit the risk of spurious correlation by employing statistical corrections for multiple
testing, such as raising the p-value10 required to demonstrate statistical significance.11
Unfortunately, the FDA will rarely be able to verify this number.
This paper asks whether there is a better way. In particular, we explore whether there is a
process that allows approval of a drug based on post hoc subgroup analysis without the risks of
opportunistic behavior and spurious correlation or the cost of unnecessary additional trials.
Based on our current statistical understanding, we offer two compromises to achieve this result.
The FDA’s current position is that whenever possible sponsors specify the patient
subgroups they plan to study before conducting a trial. However, there will be cases where
treatment-sensitive subgroups are not known before the trial. Our first proposal is to identify
these subgroups using an “adaptive group sequential design” trial. In standard trials, patients are
typically assigned to the treatment or control group according to a pre-set randomization scheme
and remain in their assigned groups. In an adaptive design, new patients can be randomized to
treatment or control based on the performance of patients previously enrolled in the trial. The
goal is to identify treatment-sensitive subgroups based on data from early enrollees in order to
power up analysis of those subgroups among later enrollees. Adaptive trials may require a larger
sample size than standard trials, but they do not require as many total subjects as performing a
subsequent trial based on post hoc analysis following an initial, failed trial. Moreover, the
process is faster because only one trial is conducted.
Our second proposal is that, in certain situations, it may be permissible to approve a drug
on the basis of post hoc analysis if that analysis were done in a manner that eliminated the
incentive for data dredging. For example, the analysis could be conducted by an independent
consultant rather than the sponsor. To address concerns about whether the consultant is truly
independent of the sponsor, we suggest some statistical algorithms that help the consultant
identify patient subgroups which the FDA can trust are not the product of data dredging. These
algorithms may be thought of as veil of ignorance rules12 because they blind the consultant to
information so as to ensure the consultant is not indirectly captured by the drug sponsor. Our
most promising algorithm is what we call “split-sample analysis.” This reform would give the
consultant access only to a random subsample of the trial data as selected by the FDA. The
consultant would be asked to identify subgroups based on post hoc subgroup analysis on this
10

In this context, the p-value of a statistical estimate is one minus the probability that the estimate is different from
zero, which signifies no treatment effect. In other words, if p < 0.05, then it can be said that we are more than 95%
sure that the estimated treatment effect is different than zero.
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The corrections are explained at greater length in the text accompanying note 38.
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For a discussion of this class of rules, see Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111
Yale L. J. 399 (2001).
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“exploratory” sample. The sponsor would then be permitted to seek drug approval for a
subgroup without conducting an additional clinical trial under two conditions. First, it can only
obtain approval for a subgroup reported by outside consultant. Second, it can only obtain
approval for a subgroup if the drug was significantly effective and safe in that subgroup in the
remainder of the trial sample, which we call the “confirmatory” sample. Importantly,
significance will be judged according to a higher standard to account for the risk of spurious
correlation due to multiple testing bias. This protects against false positives in two ways.
Because the outside consultant does not have access to confirmatory sample, it cannot help the
sponsor out by choosing subgroups that respond positively only in the confirmatory sample. Nor
can the consultant help the sponsor by reporting a large number of subgroups based on the
exploratory sample because the sponsor pays a multiple-testing penalty in the confirmatory
subsample for each additional subgroup that the consultant reports.
To illustrate the potential benefit of increased flexibility in the drug approval process and
to demonstrate how our statistical algorithms could address the data manipulation problem, we
conduct a case study of Pharmacyclics’ MGd, a drug for the treatment of non-small cell lung
cancer (NSCLC) patients with brain metastases. The company was unable to demonstrate
efficacy in its confirmatory Phase III trial.13 Their own post hoc subgroup analysis suggested
that the insignificant finding was due to enrollment of subjects whose brain tumors had already
proven resistant to radiation therapy. These subjects were unlikely to respond to any treatment,
including MGd. Excluding these subjects, the sponsor showed MGd had a statistically
significant treatment effect.14 However, the FDA rejected Pharmacyclics’ application to market
the drug.15 Mimicking the role of outside consultants, we apply our proposed statistical
algorithms to correct for bias due to any opportunistic behavior by the sponsor. We find that one
of our algorithms would have surely validated Pharmacyclics’ claims and the other – splitsample analysis – would have validated them with probability 0.11. That is, there is at least a
one-in-ten chance that truly independent analysis would have led to the approval of MGd.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 1 explains how the FDA
currently handles heterogeneous treatment response. Section 2 discusses the problem of spurious
correlation and opportunism associated with post hoc subgroup analysis. Section 3 presents trial
designs and institutional arrangements coupled with statistical analyses that allow identification
of subgroups for which the drug is effective in a manner that limits false positives and the cost of
trials. Finally, Section 4 examines data from the final Phase III MGd trial to illustrate the new
statistical methods we propose. We acknowledge that this article is not the right venue to present
13

See infra text accompanying notes 64and 66.
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Id. See also Personal communication with then-CEO Richard Miller, Mar. 14, 2008.

15

See B. Jungbauer, Pharmacyclics' Xcytrin Gets FDA "Not Approvable" For NSCLC Patients With Brain
Metastases, The Pink Sheet (Dec. 28, 2007).
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formal statistical derivations and discuss in the future statistical research required to deal with the
statistical question raised by our proposals in the conclusion.
1.

FDA policy on heterogeneity in treatment response

The Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act requires that the FDA verify that a drug is safe and
effective before it is approved for marketing as a therapeutic.16 FDA regulations typically
require that a company applying for marketing approval conduct two Phase III trials to
demonstrate efficacy and relatively tolerable side effects.17 Although regulations do not spell out
exactly the evidentiary standard to which the FDA holds a new drug, the FDA has issued a
guidance that emphasizes a drug should evaluated based on all the patients that enroll in a trial18
and that requires the rate of false positive findings be set to 5 percent.19 The implication – borne
out by practice – is that the FDA judges the efficacy of a drug by the difference between average
outcomes in the treatment and control arms of a trial.
The FDA understands that there is heterogeneity of treatment effects across patient
subgroups.20 But it only accommodates this heterogeneity in a limited way. First, it encourages
sponsors to specify prior to conducting a trial – or in statistic parlance, specify a priori – the
subgroups they plan to analyze.21 When this is done, sponsors must account for the risk of
spurious correlation due to multiple testing bias when setting their initial sample size and when
analyzing data from a trial.22 The FDA guidance does not explicitly state that significant
16

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).

17

Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 527 n. 2 (2d
ed. 1991). For a more detailed analysis of the two-trial requirement, see Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish
the “Gold Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence in the FDA Modernization Act of
1997, 54 Food & Drug L. J. 127, 129-130 (1999) (explaining that a second trial is due to the scientific requirement
of replication, that the requirement is occasionally waived, and that biologics are less likely to face this
requirement).
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This is called the intent-to-treat population. It includes even the subjects that drop out. See Food and Drug
Agency, International Conference on Harmonisation; Guidance on Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials,
Availability, 63(179) Fed. Reg. 49583, 49593 (Sept. 16, 1998) (henceforth “Statistical Guidance” (§5.2.1 Full
Analysis Set). The alternative is to evaluate the drug on the per-protocol population. In this case the drug is
evaluated only among subjects who enroll, do not drop out, and follow all trial procedures.

19

Id. at 49291 (§3.5 Sample Size).

20

Id. at 49589 (§3.2 Multicenter Trials).

21

Id. at 49595 (§5.7 Subgroups, Interactions, and Covariates).

22

Id. at 49587 (§2.2.5 Multiple Primary Variables). The agency recognizes that the corrections are less severe
where subgroups overlap and therefore produce correlated test statistics. If two subgroups are mutually exclusive,
the outcomes across groups are statistically independent. The appropriate adjustment for multiple testing bias is the
Bonferroni adjustment, which is described in Section 2. If the two subgroups overlap in part, the outcomes of the
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treatment effects among a priori specified subgroups can be the basis for drug approval, but it
does not rule it out.
Second, the FDA acknowledges that it will not always be possible to identify subgroups a
priori and that exploratory analysis of trial data may be required to identify subgroups.23 The
FDA’s approach to subsequent so-called post hoc subgroup analysis depends on the average
treatment effect in the full trial population and whether the outcome at issue concerns efficacy or
safety.
If the sponsor cannot demonstrate that the average treatment effect is sufficient that the
drug will be approved for the full trial population, post hoc subgroup analysis by itself cannot be
used to obtain approval for a subgroup.24 The FDA has not approved a single drug solely on the
basis of post hoc subgroup analysis.25 The FDA does permit a sponsor to use post hoc subgroup
analysis identify a subgroup and then to conduct a subsequent trial on that subgroup to confirm
the findings of the subgroup analysis. But another trial can be very costly.26 And there is no
indication that the FDA allows sponsors to combine or “pool” the data from the subgroup in the
initial trial with data on the subgroup from the subsequent confirmatory trial to establish a
significant positive result for the subgroup across the two trials.27 Such a combination would
mitigate the sample size requirement – and hence costs – for the confirmatory trial.
Even if the sponsor is able to demonstrate that its drug is on average safe and effective
for the full trial population in the initial trial, the FDA may require the sponsor to demonstrate
the drug is effective and safe for subgroups defined by the agency in order to validate the results
for the full trial population. FDA guidelines identify subgroups defined by centers in multicenter
trials as one such check on the consistency of the trial’s main results,28 but clinically and
groups will be positively correlated. In that case the failure of a test on one group will contribute to the failure of a
test for the overlapping second group. This reduces the risk of spurious results from statistical tests on the second
group. Therefore, something weaker than the Bonferroni adjustment is required to correct for multiple testing bias.
23

Id at 49595 (§5.7).

24

Id. at 49595 (§5.7). See also John Powers et al., FDA Evaluation of Antimicrobials: Subgroup Analysis, Letter to
Editor, 126(6) Chest 2298 (June 2005).

25

Aldo P. Maggioni, et al., FDA and CPMP Rulings on Subgroup Analyses, 107 Cardiology 97, 99 (2007).

26

It is difficult to estimate from published data the cost of individual trials but it is possible to estimate the cost of
different phases of clinical testing. The out-of-pocket plus opportunity costs of phase I are $45.7 million, phase II
are $65.1 million, and phase III are $205.5 million. See DiMasi, et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 162 (table 1) and 165 (table 3). If phase III involves just two trials, then the cost of per phase III trial is over $100
million.

27

We examine this approach in infra note 43.

28

FDA, Statistical Guidance, supra note 18, at 49589 (§3.2)
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biologically defined subgroups have also been suggested.29 If certain subgroups do not show
efficacy or show side effects, the FDA may require that the drug label state it is indicated only
for the subpopulations where it has been demonstrated both effective and safe. For example,
following the Val-HeFT trial of 160 mg valsartan for patients with heart failure, the FDA only
approved the drug for patients who are intolerant to ACE inhibitors. The reason was that in the
full trial population the drug was superior to placebo only with respect to only one (combined
mortality and morbidity) of the two outcomes studied.30 (The other outcome was mortality
alone.) However, the drug was superior on both outcomes in the non-ACE subgroup.31 The
FDA may also require the sponsor for a drug with an uneven or uncertain safety profile to
conduct Phase IV post-approval trials. If the Phase IV trials reveal dangerous side effects, FDA
has the ability to alter a drug’s labeling to reflect those risks or to yank a drug from the market.
In short, the FDA takes a conservative and asymmetric approach with respect to subgroup
analysis.32 If subgroups are identified prior to trial, they may positively influence approval so
long as the sponsor powers the study to address multiple testing concerns. If subgroups cannot
be identified prior to trial, post hoc subgroup analysis can only be used to negatively influence
approval or to justify new, costly trials.33
It is worth noting that the FDA’s approach – judging drugs largely on the basis of average
treatment effects – implicitly assumes that doctors are very bad at matching the right patient
subgroups to drugs.34 To understand why, observe that the average treatment effect of a drug
(relative to control ) is equal to its positive treatment effect among patient subgroups that
benefit from the drug (i.e.,
) plus its negative treatment effects among those who do not
(i.e.,
):
|

1

|

where
Pr
is the fraction of people who benefit from the drug. However, the drug
only harms patients among whom it is contraindicated if doctors give those patients the drug.
29

See Powers et al., supra note 24, at 2298.

30

The primary endpoint of a trial is the outcome on which the treatment is judged.

31

See Maggioni et al., supra note 25, at 99.

32

The European Union’s Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) has a similar policy. Id. at 97.

33

See Richard Wunderink et al., FDA Evaluation of Antimicrobials: Subgroup Analysis, Letter to Editor, 126(6)
Chest 2300 (June 2005) (highlighting asymmetric implications of post hoc subgroup analysis for FDA approval).

34

See Anup Malani and Feifang Hu, The option value of new therapeutics 14, unpublished manuscript (2004). The
bad matching may be because there is no way to determine which patients benefit and which do not, because doctors
cannot or do not distinguish between patients that benefit and those that do not, or because doctors give the drug to
patients that they know will not benefit from it.

8

The problem is that the FDA’s average-effects rule mathematically assumes this occurs, i.e., that
doctors give the drug to every patient even if it harms those patients. If the FDA had more faith
in doctors, it would instead estimate the value of a drug solely by its positive effects among the
subgroup that benefits from the drug.35 The FDA would not have to worry about harming
patients for whom the drug is inappropriate because doctors would not give these patients the
drug.
2.

Cost and benefits from post hoc subgroup analysis

The FDA’s conservative position on post hoc subgroup analysis is based on concerns that
multiple testing creates a risk of spurious correlation, which can result in false positive drug
approvals.36 To illustrate, consider the following Statistics 101-type hypothetical. Suppose there
is a population that can be divided into 10 mutually exclusive subgroups. For example, if the
trial population ranges in age uniformly from 20 to 70, we can divide the group into 10 equally
sized five-year age bins: 20-24, 25-30, etc. Suppose also that there is a drug which has no effect
on either the full population or on any subgroup, though there is some random variation in
observed outcomes either due to the drug or natural progression. For example, we might assume
that the treatment effect for each subgroup is a normally distributed random variable with mean
equal to zero and variance equal to one. The probability that the drug will be proven effective on
the full population with a confidence level of 95% is just 5%.
But if the sponsor seeking approval for our hypothetical drug is permitted to separately
test the drug against each of the 10 subgroups, the probability that he will be able to demonstrate
efficacy for at least one subgroup is 0.4 (= 1 – 0.9510). This obviously raises the risk of false
positives, that is, the possibility of approving the drug even though it has not been demonstrated
effective at the 95% confidence level.
If the FDA knows that the sponsor will test the drug against 10 subgroups, it can
implement a multiple testing correction or penalty to eliminate spurious results. For example, if
the outcomes in the 10 subgroups are known to be uncorrelated, then it can change the threshold
p-value required for approval from p = 0.05 to p = 0.05 / (number of tests) or 0.005.37 This
correction is known as the Bonferroni adjustment. It ensures the probability of observing even
one subgroup with significant treatment effects is back to 5%. The proper p-value adjustment in

35

This value is larger than the average effect of the drug in clinical trials. Because
|
|
|
1
.

|

0,

36

See Kulynych, supra note 17, at 141, John A. Lewis, Statistical Issues in the Regulation of Medicine, 14 Stat. in
Med. 127, 132 (1995).

37

We are ignoring the 11th test on the full population to keep the numbers simple and because the full population
result is positively correlated with each subgroup result.
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the cases where outcomes in the subgroups are correlated is different, but this correlation and the
adjustment may be derived from the data.38
The problem becomes intractable, however, if the FDA does not know the number of
subgroups against which the sponsor will test its drug. In that case the FDA cannot impose a
proper multiple testing penalty. This problem becomes exponentially more severe the larger the
number of possible subgroups. Suppose the sponsor can also divide the adult population by
gender (male/female) and by ethnicity (white/black/Hispanic/other) and the drug still has no
treatment effect for any subgroup. Now the available subgroups has jumped from 10 based
solely on age to 80 (= 10 × 2 × 4) based on a combination of age, gender and ethnicity. If the
sponsor can cherry-pick a subgroup in which to demonstrate efficacy, the probability it will be
find able to find at least one with a p-value less than 0.05 is 0.98 (= 1 – 0.9580)! The sponsor has
a strong financial incentive to cherry-pick in this manner because the alternative may be not to
obtain any return on its investment in the drug. We call this the problem of opportunistic
behavior by sponsors.39
The FDA’s response to this risk is to base its drug approval decision solely on average
treatment effects for the full trial population. This bars any approval based on post hoc subgroup
analysis without further clinical trials. But this response swings the pendulum of error too far in
the opposite direction. Instead of approving some drugs with no treatment effect (false
positives), the FDA’s conservative policy rejects some drugs with positive treatment effects for
some subgroups (false negatives) or increases the costs of drugs if the sponsor conducts a followon trial to confirm the results of post hoc subgroup analysis. To illustrate the problem of false
negatives, suppose that the drug in our hypothetical actually has positive treatment effects in one
of the 10 subgroups defined by age. The probability of approving the drug based on the results
for the full trial population is virtually zero.40

38

Sandrine Dudoit and Mark van der Laan, Multiple testing procedures with applications to genomics (New York:
Springer, 2008). See also the discussion in n. 22.

39

We do not dispute that ex ante drug sponsors have an incentive to produce drugs that actually work. Productive
drugs surely generate more revenue than unproductive ones. The problem is post hoc subgroup analysis we examine
occurs after a drug sponsor has found that the average patient does not benefit from its drug. Therefore it is facing a
loss equal to the cost of its drug development expenses. The only reason it has to avoid spurious correlation due to
multiple testing is litigation risk from failure-to-warn products liability suits. But these suits can be foreclosed by
appropriate warnings. Moreover, they do not cover the risk of a drug being less effective than alternative treatment.
Finally, it is unlikely that the average ineffective drug has expected litigation costs larger than the incurred cost of
development.

40

One would need five or more subgroups that do not benefit to “show” a benefit. This is roughly equivalent to the
probability that five or more successes out of ten draws from a binomial distribution with p=0.05. The formula and

value are Pr
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1

∑

0.05 0.95

0.00000275.
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Before we can suggest a compromise solution, a good question to ask is whether post hoc
subgroup analysis can ever provide sufficiently reliable information to warrant approval of a
drug, even ignoring the risks from spurious correlation and opportunistic behavior. After all,
when subgroups are not specified before a trial begins, the trial is not powered – i.e., does not
have sufficient sample size and thus does not generate sufficient statistical information – to
estimate subgroup effects in a manner that meets the usual standards for confidence (5%) and
power (20%).41 Compounding this problem is that subgroups by definition have smaller sample
size than the full trial population.
We do not think, however, that these concerns render post hoc analysis useless. There
are a number of technical reasons why such analysis may yield useful information even without a
larger sample. First, sample size calculations are based on estimates of the variance of treatment
effects in the full trial population. Because those estimates themselves have sample variation,
there is a positive probability that they are in fact too high, leaving samples larger than required
for accurate identification of subgroup effects. Second, because subgroups are a subset of the
full trial population, they are correlated with that population. Thus analysis of the full trial
population and one subgroup requires something less than a two-fold overestimate of variance to
be powered to give reliable information. Third, because subgroups may be more homogenous
than the full trial population, the subgroup may have smaller variation in treatment effects. This
diminished variation means that doubling the number of subgroups does not double the required
sample size for the trial. We shall demonstrate this in our analysis of the MGd trial.
3.

Rehabilitating post hoc subgroup analysis

In this section we discuss two proposals that offer a compromise between (1) false
positives due to opportunistic behavior and (2) false negatives or the cost of additional trials due
to the FDA’s cautious approach to subgroup analysis. Our aim is to extract more reliable
information on subgroup effects from trial data that can be used to approve drugs for use in
subgroups with as little additional cost as possible from larger sample size in the initial trial or a
new trial.
Our first proposal – the use of adaptive designs – should not come as a surprise. It has
been advocated by biostatisticians and regulators as a way to reduce sample size or limit harm to
trial participants even in the absence of varying treatment effects across patient subgroups.42 The
41

See Salim Yusuf et al., Analysis and Interpretation of Treatment Effects in Subgroups of patients in Randomized
Clinical Trials, 266 JAMA 93, 94 (1991).

42

See, e.g., Donald A. Berry, Bayesian clinical trials, 5 Nature Reviews - Drug Discovery 27 (2006) (arguing that
adaptive design can be employed to lower sample size and improve treatment outcomes for enrolled patients); Scott
Gottlieb, Speech before 2006 Conference on Adaptive Trial Design, Washington, DC (July 10, 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2006/trialdesign0710.html (last checked Jan. 28, 2009) (observing that adaptive
designs can ends trials of drugs with severe side effects more quickly).
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remainder of this section sketches how adaptive designs help address subgroup effects and
discuss the sample size costs of those designs. The second proposal – deferred to the next
section – requires a modified form of subgroup analysis to be performed by an outside
consultant. It would also allow the FDA to approve a drug without the expense of further trials.
a.

What the FDA should continue to do

Before explaining our reform proposals, we want to highlight two things that the FDA
gets right in its current policy towards subgroup analysis.43 First, the FDA is correct that, if the
identity of sensitive subgroups is known prior to a trial, the sponsor should set the sample size
for a trial so that the trial is able to estimate significant results for these subgroups.44 For reasons
mentioned earlier (correlation between subgroup outcomes and full trial population outcomes
and greater homogeneity within subgroups), the additional sample size required to analyze two
subgroups is not double that required to analyze the single full trial population. Therefore, the
costs of powering a trial to test a priori specified subgroups is less than proportional to the
number of groups, as is often assumed.

43

However, we are concerned that the FDA makes other mistakes when aggregating information across clinical
trials. Although the FDA may correctly apply multiple-testing corrections within trials, there is reason to be
concerned that the FDA does not apply those corrections correctly across trials. Suppose a sponsor conducts an
initial trial that does not show intent-to-treat effects but post hoc analysis reveals possible subgroup effects, and the
sponsor conducts a second trial solely to confirm the subgroup effects. One the one hand, the second trial should be
able to credit subgroup members in the first trial towards sample size requirements in the second trial. On the other
hand, a significant result in the second trial may be spurious because it is itself a second test. Indeed, if one
conducted 100 trials on a given subgroup, 5% would show significant effects for that subgroup even if its true effect
is zero. This risk of multiple testing across trials is partly addressed by the fact that a company must inform the
FDA of every trial it conducts to support an IND and by the fact that many journals will not publish an article
reporting the results of a trial that has not been reported to a trial registry such as clinicaltrials.gov. See 21 C.F.R. §
312.23 (2008); Catherine De Angelis, et al., Clinical trial registration: a statement from the International Committee
of Medical Journal Editors, 141 Ann. Intern. Med. 477 (2004). We cannot, however, find evidence from stated FDA
policy or practice that the FDA understands and properly addresses these concerns. That said, it is likely the case
that the extreme cost of Phase III trials limits the frequency of opportunistic behavior across multiple trials.
44

An even better approach may be to specify subgroups not by patient characteristics at baseline, but by an
algorithm that has as inputs not just those characteristics but also outcomes recorded as the trial progresses. Suppose
the sponsor suspects that treatment effects may depend on one of 10 genetic markers, but is not sure which one.
Instead of picking one of the those markers before the trial begins, the sponsor could, for example, specify that after
fraction of subjects have enrolled, it will correlate those markers with outcomes and pick as a subgroup those
subjects possessing the marker with the highest correlation with outcomes. So long as φ is specified before the
trial begins, it is theoretically possible – though perhaps not easy – to derive a sample size to ensure this trial is
properly powered. There may not be any penalty for multiple testing so that the critical p-value may remain 0.05.
Nor is there a risk of opportunistic behavior by the sponsor since the FDA can implement the algorithm itself and
verify the subgroup the sponsor has identified as correct.
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Second, the FDA is also correct to use multiple-testing adjustments to avoid spurious
results from analysis of a priori specified subgroups. The FDA is aware that Bonferroni
adjustments may be too conservative because of the assumption that subgroups are independent.
Because some patients fall in multiple subgroups or share biological features of members in
other subgroups, treatment results in one subgroup may be related to effects in another subgroup.
Thus, separate tests on two subgroups are less than two bites at the apple. Applying a Bonferroni
adjustment in this case would result in an overcorrection for the risk of spurious correlation.
b.

Adaptive trials proposal
i.

Background on adaptive trials

The prototypical clinical trial is a fixed design trial. In this design, patients are
randomized between a treatment group and a control group. The total number of patients
enrolled in the trial – the sample size – and the fraction of patients assigned to treatment group
are fixed before the trial begins and remain the same until it ends. The sample size required to
run such a trial depends on the minimal size of clinically-relevant treatment effects the sponsor
of the treatment effect from the drug.45
wants to be able to identify and the variance
The problem is that the sponsor may not know these parameters. Indeed, one of the
purposes of the trial is to estimate these parameters. One solution is to use results from prior
studies of the sponsor’s drug or of related drugs. When such studies are not available or are
unreliable, the sponsor can use what is called an adaptive design trial. Such a trial begins
without firm or completely reliable estimates of the parameters above. Instead, the trial employs
real time data gathered from early-enrolling patients to refine estimates of the parameters and
adjust sample size or treatment allocation based on the new estimates.
There are two types of adaptive designs that use interim data to modify sample size while
the trial is in progress. In one, called a sequential-group approach, the sponsor starts with a trial
that is conservatively large – using parameters at the lower end of the range for clinicallyrelevant effects and at the higher end of the range for variation in treatment effects – but stops
the trial early if interim data suggest that treatment effects are larger than clinically relevant or
have smaller variance than hypothesized. The other design, called simply an adaptive approach,
does the opposite. It starts with a trial that is deliberately small and extends the trial if estimates
of the treatment effect are smaller than the clinically relevant amount or estimates of the
treatment effect variance are larger than hypothesized. Either adaptive design requires a larger
sample size than a fixed design. Moreover, because the trial is updated after the sponsor “tests”

45

See supra note 9.
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the data by estimating treatment effects, the critical p-value may have to be reduced to account
for multiple testing. The exact multiple-testing penalty has been derived in statistical literature.46
There are also adaptive designs intended to adjust the proportion of enrolled subjects
assigned to the treatment group based on interim data analysis. If, for example, outcomes in the
treatment group show higher variance relative to the control group than anticipated, then the
sponsor may change group assignments so that more than half of subjects get treatment. So long
as the estimate of the variance of treatment effects – the difference in outcomes in the treatment
and control groups – does not increase, so that the sample size remains constant, the sponsor
pays no multiple-testing penalty for such an adaptive design.47
The FDA is open to use of adaptive designs. Its Critical Path initiative begun in 2004,
seeks to identify biological and statistical innovations that can improve the efficiency of clinical
trials and incorporate them into the drug development and approval process. That initiative has
identified adaptive designs as one area on which to focus its attention. Indeed, the FDA is
expected to release a guidance on adaptive designs to clarify its thinking.48
ii.

Adaptive design for subgroup analysis

None of these adaptive designs, however, are specifically intended to address subgroup
effects. They are mainly directed at optimizing over power and cost for main group effects.
That does not mean that that no one has thought of applying adaptive designs to estimate
subgroup effects. We know of no instances, however, where the FDA has approved an adaptive
design to facilitate subgroup analysis, though the FDA has considered or allowed a number of
trials with adaptive designs.
How might an adaptive design be used for subgroup analysis? Consider a two-arm trial
(treatment and control)49 with sample size set to test just one hypothesis: the average treatment
effect for one all enrolled patients is zero. At some interim point, the sponsor or the independent
data monitoring committee (IDMC) examines the data to determine if there is a subgroup of
patients on which the trial should focus because they may be particularly responsive to treatment.
46

Cyrus R. Mehta and Nitin R. Patel, Adaptive, Group Sequential and Decision Theoretic Approaches to Sample
Size Determination, 25 Statistics in Medicine 3250-3269 (2006).

47

Even if the estimate of variance of treatment effects falls, the sponsor cannot stop the trial early. But if the
estimate of overall variance of treatment effects rises, then the sample size increases and the sponsor must pay a
multiple-testing penalty. The reason is that it was given a “real option” of testing and must pay a price for this
option.

48

Scott Gottlieb, Speech before 2006 Conference on Adaptive Trial Design, Washington, DC (July 10, 2006),
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2006/trialdesign0710.html (last checked Mar. 7, 2008).

49

This is also called a parallel-armed trial.
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There are two types of data that might be used to identify subgroups: baseline characteristics
measured before the start of a trial alone or treatment outcomes measured during the course of
the trial. In the first case, the sponsor looks for abnormal variation in a relevant covariate. For
example, if there is much more variation than expected in treatment history or in the pre-trial
progression of symptoms, the full trial population can be divided into subgroups using a cut-off
based on the extent of prior treatment or symptoms. In the second case, the IDMC may look at
the relationship between certain covariates and treatment effects. (The IDMC is used rather than
the sponsor to ensure that the sponsor does not become unblinded.) If the data suggests, for
example, that certain age or ethnic subpopulations are responding better to treatment, those
groups can become target subgroups for the study.
After this interim analysis, the sponsor would have to revisit the objective of the trial.
There are two choices. First, the sponsor could examine just one hypothesis but limit it to a
subgroup identified by interim analysis as particularly sensitive to treatment. Specifically, the
null hypothesis would become: the treatment effect for one subgroup is zero. We assume in this
case that, after the interim analysis, the sponsor would discontinue enrollment of subjects that do
not belong to this subgroup, lest they waste sample size. The sponsor’s other choice is to
examine two or more hypotheses based on the number of subgroups discovered through interim
analysis. For example, if that analysis identified two subgroups based on ethnicity, the trial
might test two hypotheses: the treatment effect for whites is zero and the treatment effect for
non-whites is zero.
As with adaptive designs targeting sample size adjustments, adaptive designs targeting
subgroups will require a larger sample size and appropriate adjustments of the statistical
methodology. These can be derived, though we do not do so here. In particular, the design may
require that that the sponsor pay a penalty, i.e., that the results be held to a more stringent or
lower critical p-value before they are declared statistically significant, to account for the
possibility of multiple testing. We explore these penalties in the Appendix.
Before we conclude our discussion of adaptive designs, it is worth noting an important
weakness of these designs. Because of ethical and profit considerations, they may not be optimal
for identifying side effects of treatments. If interim analysis suggests a particular subgroup may
have worse side effects, both the sponsor and patient advocates will push to exclude that
subgroup from further analysis. But doing so limits the amount of data we have on that subgroup
and thus on the side effects of the drug.
c.

Proposal for independent post hoc subgroup analysis

In this subsection we consider how it might be possible – working with a fixed, nonadaptive design trial – to use post hoc subgroup analysis to approve a drug without further trials.
Post hoc subgroup analysis does not increase the risk of false positive drug approvals so long as
the FDA makes appropriate multiple-testing corrections. But appropriate multiple-testing
15

corrections require knowledge of the number of tests the sponsor has performed. Because of the
financial incentive to have its drug approved, the sponsor cannot be relied upon to truthfully
report the number of tests it has performed.50 Indeed, the FDA can be confident that the sponsor
probably conducted more tests than that for which the FDA plans to adjust. Therefore, there
remains a residual risk of false negatives above 5%.
i.

Choosing an independent agent

A critical assumption in this logic is that the sponsor is financially interested in having
the drug approved. If post hoc subgroup analysis were performed by a truly independent agent,
then the FDA could rely upon that agent’s report of the number of tests it conducted and fully
eliminate the risk of false positives by means of multiple-testing adjustments. Of course the real
question is whether the agent is truly independent, a topic to which we will turn in a moment.
There are two basic candidates for an independent agent: the FDA and an outside
statistical consulting firm. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. The strength of using the
FDA is that by doing the post hoc subgroup analysis itself, the FDA knows immediately the
number of tests conducted. There is no need to rely on the absence of any other motive, as will
be the case with an outside consulting firm. There are two weaknesses of the FDA. It has
limited resources that make it difficult to maintain even the current level of scrutiny of new drug
applications (NDAs).51 Moreover, the FDA is subject to political pressure. It has been criticized
for being influenced both by drug companies and by political backlash following approval of
unsafe drugs.52 These pressures are unlikely to perfectly offset to create an unbiased
decisionmaker. As a result, the FDA may conduct too much subgroup analysis – at the cost of

50

We have considered the possibility that the FDA could specify prior to a phase III trial the exact subgroups the
sponsor may examine. This could be based on the subject-matter of the trial or on the FDA’s knowledge of data
from trials of competing drugs by other sponsors. There are two problems with this reform. First, the sponsor could
specify subgroups based on subject matter as well as the FDA and has a strong financial interest in doing so. We
doubt there are valuable subgroups that the FDA could propose that the sponsor will not have already considered.
Second, sponsors of the competing drugs are likely to object to the FDA’s use of their trial data – which is treated as
a trade secret, see Article 39.3 of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement – in this manner. They
would have a reasonable argument that this competitively favors later new drug applicants over earlier ones. It
would also subtly reduce the incentive to innovate quickly.
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See, e.g., Institute of Medicine, The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public 193
(2007). Drawing inspiration from PDUFA, one possible solution is to charge companies that seek drug approval for
a patient subgroup to pay higher user fees to fund subgroup analysis conducted by the FDA.
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See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. is Faulted for Drug-Safety Process, New York Times (Sept. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/business/22fdacnd.html?ex=1316577600&en=04c9d9824b892f3b&ei=5088&
partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (last checked Jan. 30, 2009); Avery Johnson and Ron Winslow, Drug Makers Say FDA
Safety Focus Is Slowing New-Medicine Pipeline, Wall Street Journal (June 30, 2008), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121476772560213981. html?mod=hps_us_whats_news (last checked Jan. 30, 2009).
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false positives – or too little subgroup analysis – at the cost of false negatives or more costly
approval.
The alternative is an outside statistical consulting firm. Many already exist to help
sponsors design and analyze data from trials.53 The strength of consulting firms is, perhaps,
more statistical expertise than the FDA. Unlike the FDA, which has limited resources and no
need to compete, these firms have every reason to specialize and innovate because it may make it
more likely they are selected to perform subgroup analysis.
The main weakness of the consulting firm approach is that these firms may not be truly
independent. Sponsors are repeat players. A consulting firm may have an incentive to give a
favorable analysis so as to secure repeat business from sponsors. That repeat business may be
for subgroup analysis or some other statistical service. This is a lesson well learned from the
corporate accounting scandals from earlier this decade.54 Perhaps the indirect influence of
sponsors can be addressed by requiring the FDA to select the outside consultant to perform post
hoc analysis, by blinding the sponsor to the outside firm selected, and by banning firms that
perform post hoc analysis from providing other statistical services to sponsors. We wonder,
however, whether the agency will always be able to keep the identity of the consulting firm
secret, even after the analysis is completed and the FDA has made its regulatory decision
concerning a sponsor’s drug. Moreover, restricting the consulting firms’ scope of business will
limit their ability to attract talent and incentive to innovate in the area of subgroup analysis since
it comes at the cost of other lines of business.
A second weakness of using consulting firms is that “independence of the sponsor” is not
the same thing as “motivated to reduce false positives.” True independence only guarantees the
consulting firm will not be swayed by the profit interests of the sponsor. It does not guarantee
that the consulting firm extracts the most and reliable data from post hoc analysis after it is
chosen to perform that analysis. This problem is one which economists call moral hazard.
Independence merely substitutes the sponsor’s interests with those of the consulting firm. Most
likely this is cost minimization, which may imply too many false negatives or false positives,
whichever minimize the consulting firm’s labor expense.55
ii.

Statistical methods to guarantee independence

53

See, e.g., Cytel Statistical Software and Services, founded by Cyrus R. Mehta and Nitin R. Patel, and Target
Analytics, Inc., run by Mark van der Laan.

54

See Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 51, 57 (2003).

55

The outside consulting firm must also be concerned about not doing too many tests. Each useless test it performs
increases the multiple-testing adjustment for any positive finding. Minimizing false negatives requires internalizing
this negative externality. Since false negatives are unobservable, the FDA cannot directly incentivize the consulting
firm to do so. And the FDA certainly should not give the firm an incentive keyed to drug approval, because then it
would have incentives like the sponsor and replace false negatives with false positives.
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To address the problem that neither the FDA nor the outside consultant may be truly
independent of the sponsor, we propose two statistical methods to limit either agent’s ability to
skew the analysis in favor of the sponsor.56 For convenience, we shall speak as if the consulting
firm has been chosen to conduct the analysis.
No-outcome data analysis. The first approach would provide the consultant with all the
data from the trial except variables that identify treatment assignments and health outcomes and
ask it to identify subgroups based on baseline characteristics that exhibit “remarkable and
relevant variation” in the trial data. (This is similar to one of the approaches used to identify
subgroups for the adaptive design trials discussed in the last subsection.) The consultant would
not be asked to perform the post hoc subgroup analysis; that could be conducted by the sponsor,
though the FDA would rely upon positive treatment effects only for the subgroups identified by
the consultant. Whatever positive subgroup results the sponsor reports, the FDA would apply a
multiple-testing adjustment based on all the subgroups reported by the outside consultant.
In order to identify remarkable variation, the consultant needs to have a sense of what
normal variation would be. It could estimate normal variation in baseline characteristics from
trials of the sponsor’s drug or prior studies in the literature. The consultant would have to be
sensitive to exclusion and inclusion criteria, which can affect the applicability of prior data to the
current trial sample. Moreover, the consultant would have to keep in mind that any subgroup it
identifies should be defined by variables that are plausibly relevant (from our current biological
understanding of the disease targeted by the sponsor’s drug and the pharmacology of that drug)
to the treatment effects of the drug.
Split-sample analysis. The second statistical method we propose to ensure that the
consultant’s choice of subgroups is not influenced by the rug company requires splitting the data
from a trial into two parts. One part would be called the exploratory subsample and the other
part the confirmatory subsample. Importantly, the FDA must split the sample to ensure the drug
company has no influence and the sample should be split randomly to ensure the samples are
statistically independent. The consultant would only be given the exploratory subsample and be
asked to conduct a full post hoc subgroup analysis on that subsample to identify subgroups that
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These methods do not address other problems, such as the limited resources of the FDA or the insufficient
motivation of outside consulting firms. If the statistical methods we discuss help ensure that the consultant truly
cannot manipulate the data to increase false positives, then one might address the problem of a consultant’s
motivation by giving it stock in the sponsor. (This is identical to extracting the outcome or a random subsample of
data from the data archives of the drug sponsor. We consider granting the consultant stock instead because it is
virtually impossible to separate the sponsor from knowledge of its data.) We do not advocate this because it is too
radical and would be politically infeasible. That said, giving the consultant some sponsor stock is not the same as
allowing the sponsor to conduct the entire post hoc subgroup analysis because the statistical methods we propose in
the main text require that the consultant not have access to certain data that the sponsor already has, or could easily
obtain.
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respond better to the drug.57 The sponsor would then be allowed to perform post hoc subgroup
analysis on the confirmatory sample using only the subgroups identified from the exploratory
subsample by the consultant. As before, the FDA would apply a multiple-testing penalty based
on all the subgroups reported by the outside consultant. If, after such penalty, the confirmatory
subsample validates the positive subgroup effects from the exploratory subsample, the FDA
could approve the drug only for those subgroups.
Both statistical methods ensure that subgroups are identified independent of the interests
of the sponsor. Since the first method does not give the consultant access to outcome data, it
cannot choose subgroups to help or hinder the sponsor. Since the second method requires the
sponsor to limit its subgroup analysis to a subsample that is statistically independent of the
subsample analyzed by the consultant, the consultant’s analysis cannot help the sponsor engage
in data mining. Moreover, neither method requires that the FDA impose any additional
multiple-testing penalty beyond one based on the total number of subgroups identified by the
consultant.
Each statistical method also has its shortcomings. The weakness of the no-outcome data
approach is that the subgroups with the most remarkable variation may not be perfectly
correlated with the subgroups that have positive and significant treatment effects. Abnormal
variation is just one factor that suggests differential treatment effects; it does not guarantee them.
The main concern with split-sample approach is that the post hoc subgroup analysis, which
would be underpowered even if performed on the whole trial sample, is particularly
underpowered if performed on subsamples. This will increase the risk of false negatives. This
risk may be considered the cost of independence under this method. In short, the two statistical
algorithms reduce, but do not eliminate false negatives.
4.

An illustration with motexafin gadolinium

In this section we illustrate our two statistical algorithms for ensuring independent post
hoc subgroup analysis by applying them to a real world example: motexafin gandolium (MGd)
for patients with brain metastases from solid lung tumor. MGd is sponsored by Pharmacyclics
(ticker PYCY), a small biotech company that branded the drug as Xcytrin. We first provide
some background on clinical testing of the drug and then discuss post hoc subgroup analysis of
the testing results.

57

The sponsor could not be asked to do this because it would likely be able to derive the confirmatory subsample
from the exploratory subsample and the full sample, which it already possesses. This would allow it to choose
subgroups ostensibly on the exploratory subsample but truly on the full sample. The result would be almost the
same as post hoc subgroup analysis by the sponsor.
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a.

Background on MGd

Tumorous cancers in one part of the body often spread – or metastasize – to other parts of
the body. In up to 24% of all cancer patients, they spread to the brain.58 The risk is especially
severe with lung cancer, where up to 50% of patients experience brain metastasis59 and
metastasis occurs earlier than with other cancers.60 Most patients with brain metastases die.
Median survival on whole brain radiation therapy, the typical conventional treatment, is only 4
months. For those who do manage to survive, however, there is a major risk of neurological
impairment.61
MGd is a drug that demonstrated the ability to increase the radiation response of tumor
cells in preclinical studies. Pharmacyclics sought to market the drug as a treatment for brain
metastases. The company filed an investigational new drug (IND) application with the FDA to
begin clinical testing of the drug in human patients. After a successful Phase I/II study,62 the
company began a Phase III study (called trial 9801) that enrolled patients with any type of
cancerous tumor who developed brain metastases. Subjects were randomized to either whole
brain radiation therapy (WBRT) alone (the control arm) or MGd and WBRT (treatment arm).
Unfortunately, this study did not find a statistically significant treatment effect with respect to
median survival or time to neurological impairment.63
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J.B. Posner, Neurological complications of cancer (Philadelphia: F.A. Davis Comp., 1995).
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M. Stuschke, W. Eberhardt, C. Pottgen, et al., Prophylactic cranial irradiation in locally advanced non-small-cell
lung cancer after multimodality treatment: Long-term follow-up and investigations of late neuropsychological
effects, 17 J. Clin. Oncol. 2700-2709 (1999); T.J. Robnett, M. Machtay, J.P. Stevenson, et al., Factor affecting the
risk of brain metastases after definitive chemoradiation for locally advanced non-small-cell lung carcinoma, 19 J.
Clin. Oncol. 1344-1349 (2001).
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Posner, supra note 58.
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Minesh P. Mehta, Patrick Rodrigus, C.H.J. Terhaard, et al., Survival and Neurological Outcomes in a Randomized
Trial of MotexafinGadolinium and Whole-Brain Radiation Therapy in Brain Metastases, 21 J. Clin. Oncol. 2529
(2003).
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The sing-armed study found a 72% radiologic response rate. P. Carde, R. Timmerman, M.P. Mehta, et al.,
Multicenter phase Ib/II trial of the radiation enhancer motexafin gadolinium in patients with brain metastases, 19 J.
Clin. Oncol. 2074-2083 (2001).
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Median survival was 5.2 mo. on treatment versus 4.9 mo. on control (p = 0.48). Median time to impairment of
neurological function was 9.5 mo. on treatment versus 8.3 mo. on control (p = 0.95). Mehta et al., supra note 61, at
2533 (Fig. 2, panel C).
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One bright spot in trial 9801, however, was that patients with specifically lung cancer did
experience statistically significant extension of time to neurological impairment.64 So
Pharmacyclics conducted a second Phase III trial (called Trial 0211) targeting only lung cancer
patients. Unfortunately, this second trial was unable to validate the results from the initial trial.
This is illustrated in Table 2, which summarizes the results from trial 0211 and from lung cancer
patients in trial 9801. According to the first panel, whereas the relative hazard rate for
neurological impairment65 was 0.61 (p = 0.05) in the initial trial, it was merely 0.78 and not
significantly different from 1 (p = 0.1) in the second trial.
Trying to explain the discrepancy between the trials and to salvage MGd for a new drug
application (NDA), Pharmacyclics conducted a post hoc subgroup analysis. According to the
company, this analysis revealed a problem at some of the study centers in France. Although the
trial protocol required that subjects be randomized to treatment as soon as they were diagnosed
with brain metastases, the French centers waited several weeks or more after diagnosis before
randomizing subjects to treatment.66 In the interim, the centers gave subjects chemotherapy67
(hence these subjects are labeled “controlled” patients in the data). Moreover, subjects were
ultimately randomized in trial 0211 only if their brain tumors progressed despite chemotherapy,
i.e., their tumors were resistant to treatment.68 So this was a self-selected group of tumors.
64

The median patient on WBRT and MgD did not experience neurological impairment in 24 months while the
median patient on WBRT alone experienced impairment at 7.4 mo (p = 0.048). Mehta et al., supra note 61, at 2533
(Fig. 2, panel C).
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Neurological impairment was judged by a battery of standardized neurocognitive tests. The tests were scored by
blinded graders. Patients were said to be impaired if the composite score was at least 1.5 standard deviations worse
than the mean of the test’s age-adjusted distribution. Christina A. Meyers, et al., Neurocognitive Function and
Progression in Patients With Brain Metastases Treated With Whole-Brain Radiation and Motexafin Gadolinium:
Results of a Randomized Phase III Trial, 22 J. Clin. Oncology 157, 158 (2004). The hazard rate for impairment is
the rate at which patients are judged impaired, i.e., it is the fraction of additional patients judged impaired each
month. The relative hazard rate is the ratio of the hazard rate in the treatment group to the rate in the control group.

66

Ordinarily, a drug sponsor is responsible for ensuring that its study centers follow trial protocols. The company
attributes the problem in this case to recruitment difficulties. Whereas the trial 9801 had 401 total patients, of which
only 251 had lung cancer, trial 0211 required 554 lung cancer patients to have the statistical power to validate the
positive results for lung cancer patients from the initial trial. This required the second trial to recruit patients from
90 treatment centers throughout the world, more than double the 40 centers involved in the initial Phase III trial.
The company argues that it is difficult to precisely enforce the protocol with so many centers involved in a study.
Personal communication with Richard Miller, former CEO of Pharmacyclics, Mar. 14, 2008.

67

Chemotherapy is not thought to be a reliable treatment for brain metastases because chemotherapy relies upon
drug delivered by blood and the brain tumor is somewhat protected from chemotherapy drugs by the blood-brain
barrier.
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The implicit but reasonable assumption here is that a brain tumor resistant to chemotherapy is resistant to any
other form of treatment.
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Whereas “uncontrolled” subjects randomized immediately had a mix of resistant and nonresistant brain tumors, the controlled subjects ultimately randomized in the problematic French
centers largely had tumors resistant to WBRT. This placed MGd at a disadvantage in these
centers.69
Not surprisingly, these subjects also did not show benefit from MGd. Excluding these
late-randomizing centers from the analysis revealed that drug had a statistically significant effect
on delay until onset of neurological impairment. As reported in the second of panel of Table 2,
the relative hazard rate for uncontrolled subjects on MGd in the 0211 trial was 0.56 (p = 0.02).
In other words, while MGd proved effective among subjects with uncontrolled brain tumor, this
effect was masked by including subjects with controlled brain tumor in the main analysis.
Pharmacyclics filed an NDA with the FDA relying on this subgroup analysis. But the FDA did
not credit the company’s explanation and finally rejected its NDA in December 2007.70
Of course, this is the company’s explanation for its unsuccessful final Phase III trial and
it had a financial stake in getting MGd approved for some subgroup. Our aim is to scrutinize
these claims by taking the role of an outside consultant and checking whether analysis of data in
a manner that is independent of the financial interests of the sponsor identifies the same sensitive
subgroups that the sponsor identified, namely the subjects with uncontrolled tumor.
b.

No-outcome data analysis

Our first analysis examines the final Phase III study (trial 0211) data stripped of outcome
variables. The idea is that an outside consultant without outcome data would not be able to
select subgroups that would financially benefit the company because it does not know whether
any subgroups had better or worse outcomes than average among the full trial population.
Instead, this consultant would identify subgroups by searching for baseline characteristics on
which current trial subjects had excess variation relative subjects in previous trials or in the
population. These characteristics could then be used to define subgroups on which the drug
company could perform post hoc subgroup analysis. If and only if that subgroup analysis
suggested the subgroup responded positively to the drug, the FDA should approve the drug for
use in that subgroup.
69

The selection story is a bit more complicated. The delay also screened out patients who had died from, inter alia,
the brain metastases prior to randomization. Since early death is an indicator of a more severe brain tumor, this
mortality screen likely selected for less severe brain tumors. It is probably the case that the selection on the basis of
resistance to chemotherapy (which likely reduced the effect of MGd) was more significant than selection based on
survival (which possibly increased the effect of MGd). The reason is that median survival following diagnosis with
brain metastases is 4 months, so it is unlikely that mortality was a material screen in the first two weeks following
diagnosis. Yet it is in these first two weeks that the company found a significant delay in neurological impairment
among patients treated with MGd.
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See supra note 23.
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To implement this algorithm, we compare the variation of certain medical characteristics
in the trial 0211 sample with variation of those variables in the initial Phase III study (trial 9801)
sample. The variables include features of the primary (lung) tumor, treatment of the primary
tumor, features of the brain metastases, the treatment of the brain metastases before enrollment,
and neurological impairment at baseline. Table 3 reports the ratio of variances of each variable
across the two samples and the p-value for the hypothesis test that the variances are equal across
the samples after adjusting for multiple testing.
Eight subgroups stand out. The 0211 trial had excess variation in the variables: days
from diagnosis of brain metastases to randomization, extracranial metastases, baseline Trail B
score, and whether the study center was in Canada. The delay variable captures some of the
company’s concern that patients in some French centers received chemotherapy for a few weeks
before being randomized and that the brain masses that survived this chemotherapy were more
resilient. The trail B is a test of cognitive ability where the subject is asked to follow a “trail” on
a sheet of paper with his pencil. A lower score is better: it indicates less time was required to
follow the trail. It also indicates that the brain metastasis probably has not advanced beyond the
point where it can be treated.
The 0211 trial also had insufficient variation in: primary tumor (PT) resected without
recurrence, primary tumor is large cell carcinoma, primary tumor controlled, and study center is
in the US. The PT resected variable is one of five categories into which a primary tumor is
categorized at the time a patient is randomized.71 The resected category indicates that the
primary tumor was surgically and successfully treated and the patients only remaining concern is
the brain metastases. The PT controlled variable is the complement of the variable that the
company identified as being responsible for the failure of the 0211 trial.
Having identified eight subgroups with remarkable variation, we now check to see if
MGd was particularly effective amongst these subgroups in the full 0211 data. For binary
variables, subgroups are defined by their two states. For continuous variables subgroups in the
0211 data are defined by whether a characteristic lies above or below the median for that
characteristic in the 9801 data. Table 4 summarizes our subgroup analyses with a multipletesting adjustment that accounts for 16 tests (eight variables with excess variation and two
subgroups for each variable). We find four subgroups have significant treatment effects, i.e.,
lower rate of neurological impairment: subjects with little delay before randomization, subjects
at U.S. study centers, subjects with low (good) baseline Trail B scores, and subjects with
uncontrolled brain metastases.
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The tumor may have been (1) “newly diagnosed,” which means the primary tumor and the brain metastasis was
diagnosed at the same time, (2) surgically removed or resected without recurrence, (3) treated for less than 4 weeks
without clear indication that it has progressed, (4) treated for greater than 4 weeks with no sign of progression, or (5)
treated for any amount of time with evidence of progression.
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Thus the no-outcome data analysis would support Pharmacyclics’ case for approval for
subjects with uncontrolled brain tumors. The other subgroups that survive no-outcome data
analysis are consistent with the company’s theory that MGd works on less resistant tumors.
Subjects randomized quickly and subjects in the U.S. are less likely to have received
chemotherapy before randomization. As for subjects with low trail B scores, these are subjects
whose tumors are not so far along that they already seriously impede subjects’ cognitive
capacity. It makes sense the treatment is also likely to work in these cases.
c. Split-sample analysis
Our second (and preferred) proposal is to split the data from trial 0211 into two
subsamples, have an outside consultant to identify subgroups via post hoc subgroup analysis on
one (exploratory) sample, and then allow the drug sponsor to validate significant treatment
effects for the other (confirmatory) sample. Only if a subgroup identified by the outside
consultant demonstrates statistically significant effects – after a multiple-testing penalty – in the
confirmatory sample should the FDA approve the drug for that subgroup. Because the outside
consultant does not have access to the confirmatory sample and because the FDA would only
credit evidence of treatment effects from the confirmatory subsample, the consultant cannot rig
its analysis to help the drug sponsor.
We begin our simulation of the split-sample analysis by randomly dividing the 0211 trial
sample into a 20% exploratory sample and an 80% confirmatory sample.72 The second step is to
conduct a subgroup analysis of the exploratory sample where subgroups are defined according to
baseline variables. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5. The vertical panel
labeled “Value A” gives the relative hazard of neurological impairment and the p-value for each
variable at value 0 for binary variables and at the first quartile for continuous variables. The
vertical panel labeled “Value B” gives the relative hazard of neurological impairment and the pvalue for each variable at value 1 for binary variables and at the third quartile for continuous
variables.73 None of the p-values have been adjusted for multiple testing.74 We choose a
subgroup (now defined both by a given variable and a specific value for that variable) for the
third step in our simulation if it has a p-value less than 0.05, i.e., if we can be 95% confident that
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Our selection of a 20-80 split is arbitrary. Further statistical analysis is required to determine the optimal split of
the sample. The larger is the exploratory sample, the greater is the probability of identifying a subgroup that
benefits but the smaller is the probability that one will be able to confirm that it benefits.
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The first two columns of data present the ratio of relative hazards among the two subgroups defined for each
variable and the p-value for this ratio.
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No multiple testing penalty is required when analyzing the exploratory sample. The only purpose in that sample
is to identify certain subgroups, relative to other subgroups, that have a better response. Moreover, the size of the
exploratory sample is too small to pass any of the usual statistical tests (e.g., p = 0.05), let alone ones that adjust for
spurious correlation from multiple testing.
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the membership in the subgroup improves treatment effects. The two subgroups we identify in
this manner are (1) enrollment at center other than one in France and (2) not having previously
received the chemotherapy drug carboplatin. The relative hazard rate (into neurological
impairment) for subjects outside France and on MGd is 0.32 (p = 0.05363) and for subjects not
having received carboplatin and on MGD is 0.039 (p = 0.07833).
The last step in the split sample analysis is to estimate the treatment effects for these
subgroups in the confirmatory sample. This analysis reveals that the relative hazard rate for
MGd among subjects outside France is 0.676 (raw p = 0.038, adj. p = 0.076) and among subjects
who had not previously been treated with carboplatin is 0.905 (raw p = 0.58, adj. p = 0.58).
Even with the high correlation (ρ = 0.39) in membership across these subgroups, the effect of
MGd outside France is not statistically significant after adjusting p-values for multiple tests (on
two groups). The effect of type of prior chemotherapy is not significant even without the
multiple-testing adjustment.
So it appears that our spit sample analysis – unlike the no-outcome data analysis – fails to
support Pharmacyclics explanation for why the 0211 trial did not validate the 9801 trial. To be
precise, however, all we have shown is that the particular sample split we randomly drew chose
did not validate Pharmacyclics claim. Perhaps another random split would validate their claim.
Indeed, a better way to characterize the value of the split-sample analysis for eliminating alleged
false negatives is to ask, what fraction of splits would validate Pharmacyclics’ claim that MGd
works in the subgroup of patients whose brain tumor was not controlled via chemotherapy?
To conduct this analysis we drew 100 splits of the 0211 trial data and ranked the
subgroups in the exploratory stage in order of statistical significance of relative hazard for
neurological impairment, just as Table 5 did for our initial split. The first row of Table 6
provides the distribution of p-values that the “uncontrolled” subgroup takes across the hundred
splits, with a smaller p-value indicating a larger significance of that difference. We find that in
35% of draws uncontrolled has a p-value of less than 0.05. Thus in 35% of cases, the
“uncontrolled” subgroup advances to the validation stage. Further, in 31% (= 11/35) of these
cases, the effect among the uncontrolled subgroup is validated in the confirmatory sample after a
conservative Bonferroni multiple-testing adjustment that accounts for the number of subgroups
that emerge from the exploratory analysis in each sample split. See row 3 of Table 6. In other
words, in only 11 % of cases, the split-sample analysis confirms Pharmacyclics’ claim that MGd
works so long as the patient’s brain tumor is not previously treated with chemotherapy.
Because in the case of MGd we have not one but two Phase III trials, there is one other
test we can do – in the spirit of split sample analysis – to verify Pharmacyclics’ claim about
uncontrolled patients. We can check whether the subgroup effects identified by the company, by
the no-outcome data analysis, and by 11 % of the split-sample analyses above can be validated
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by in the subsample of lung cancer patients in the 9801 trial.75 As can be seen in Table 2, the
uncontrolled subgroup is indeed associated with statistically significant treatment effect (RH =
0.48, p = 0.03).
Conclusion
Roughly one in five drugs that enter clinical testing fails to prove that it is effective and
safe. Even in phase III, the failure rate is 36%.76 The cost of failure is a higher cost of
developing drugs. By one commonly cited estimate, whereas the expected cost of clinical testing
per drug that begins human trials is $316.3 million, the cost of clinical testing after accounting
for the risk of failure – i.e., the cost per drug that is approved – is $802 million.77
Sometimes failure is just that: the drug has no value. But other times a drug is right for
some patients and wrong for others. Denying approval for a drug that benefits some patients, but
not the average patient, increases the costs of drug development but not the benefits. Ideally, one
would like to salvage such a drug by allowing its use for the non-average patient who would
benefit.
The challenge is bad behavior or moral hazard by drug sponsors. With post hoc subgroup
analysis (or data dredging in less polite language), sponsors will nearly always be able to find a
subgroup of patients who appear to benefit from a drug. Currently, the FDA addresses this risk
of spurious correlation by requiring sponsors to validate their findings with additional clinical
trials. But this may cost tens of millions of dollars, and in turn increase the price of drugs.
This paper offers a combination of institutional designs and statistical methods that can
limit the risk of spurious findings – or false positives – from post hoc subgroup analysis without
requiring additional, whole trials. Our proposal for adaptive trials allows the use of subgroups to
revise the hypothesis tests in a trial with little additional sample size. Our proposal for
independent statistical analysis, when combined with subgroup analysis without outcome data or
subgroup analysis validated on a split sample, can actually identify subgroups increasing the risk
of false positives or requiring additional sample size. In other words, our proposals offer an
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Indeed, we could ask the same thing of any subgroup identified by the no-outcome data analysis or the splitsample analysis that was verified in the 0211 analysis. Though we would then have to apply a multiple-testing
adjustment accounting for all the groups we test. Since only uncontrolled survives our 0211 validation, that is all we
test.
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Roughly 90 percent of drugs submitted in NDAs are approved. Christopher P. Adams and Van V. Brantner,
Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 Health Aff. 420, 422 (Exhibit 1)
(2006).

77

Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, Henry G. Grabowski, 22 J. Health Econ. 151, 167 (2003).
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approach to reduce the rate of failure in clinical trials, without a higher risk of false positives or
with minimal additional clinical testing costs.
While our proposals may be helpful, we recognize they are not panaceas. It is possible
that a drug which fails the average patient standard used by the FDA may not in fact be helpful
to any subgroup of patients. Our methods for identifying false negatives – drugs that have value
for a subgroup of patients but not the average patient – may not identify every false negative.
Finally, even if a drug is approved for the right subgroup, doctors may use it for the wrong
subgroups or use it off label. These are forms of false positives that we cannot address. Indeed,
by increasing the number of drugs available to doctors, we increase the risk of post-approval
false positives.
The reason we believe our proposals are worth pursuing, however, is that the alternatives
– using an average-patient standard or requiring additional trials – are worse. As we explained in
Section 1, the average-patient standard implicitly assumes that doctor always give the drug to the
wrong subgroup. While doctors may not be perfect at sorting patients to drugs, we do not
believe they are as bad as the FDA’s standard assumes. Moreover, trials – especially Phase III
trials – are very expensive.78 Trials focusing on subgroups are even more costly. Because fewer
patients are members of the subgroup than the full trial population, a trial focusing on a subgroup
will take longer complete recruitment. This, in turn, increases the opportunity costs of the trial.
It is natural to wonder whether our proposal to eliminate false negatives in drug approval
can also help eliminate false positives. That is, should our proposals be used to identify drugs
that have a no effect or a side effect for a patient subgroup, even though they are effective and
safe for the average patient and thus FDA-approvable? The answer is complicated. As we have
mentioned, adaptive trials are not helpful for identifying side effects.79 With respect to our other
proposals, the answer depends on whether there is reason to believe that the FDA has a skewed
incentive to disapprove helpful drugs. The central problem that motivates our proposals is moral
hazard by drug sponsors. Sponsors have a financial incentive to find subgroups that show
benefits from a drug whether or not the subgroups actually benefit from the drug. Unless there is
a corresponding incentive on the part of the FDA to disapprove a drug for certain patients though
it does not harm them, there is no reason why the FDA cannot itself conduct post hoc subgroup
analysis to identify subgroups that do not benefit from a drug. Since the FDA is conducting the
analysis, it knows the number of subgroups it has tested and thus can apply a multiple-testing
78

All phase III testing – usually two trials – is estimated to cost $205 million per drug than enters phase III. See
DiMasi, supra note 26, at 162.
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Adaptive trials use data from early enrollees to identify subgroups and then modify the trial to enroll more patients
from those subgroups so as to explore drug effects in those subgroups. When identifying subgroups with side
effects, this will require enrolling more people who one suspects will experience side effects. This is unethical and
unlikely to be approved by an Institutional Review Board. See the last paragraph of Section 3.b.ii.
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penalty to its own analysis. The only reform that we can unambiguously recommend to address
false negatives is that the FDA be sure to apply multiple testing penalties when it conducts or
requires that drug sponsors check side effects in certain subgroups.80 Just as data dredging
allows a drug company nearly always to find some subgroup of patients who appear to benefit
from a drug, the more subgroups the FDA tests for side effects, the more likely the agency will
find side effects when they do not actually exist.
Finally, we are aware that our paper raises a number of statistical questions, the answers
to which would help the FDA refine regulations that allow certain post hoc subgroup analyses to
inform approval decisions. For example: What is the proper multiple testing penalty for
adaptive design trials? Can sponsors use moments other than the variance, such as the mean or
skew, to identify subgroups in the no-outcome data analyses? What are the appropriate
proportions (20-80 or something different) to use when dividing a sample into an exploratory and
a confirmatory subsample? Should the multiple-testing penalty applied to tests on the
confirmatory subsample account for the fact that that subsample is smaller than the full sample?
Under what conditions will the no-outcome data analysis eliminate more false negatives than the
split-sample analysis. We leave these questions for future analysis by statisticians.

80

A subtle point related to this reform is that the FDA ought not blindly to apply multiple testing penalties to
subgroups that a drug sponsor voluntarily offers up as experiencing side effects. The reason is that the sponsor has
an incentive to report that it tested far more subgroups than it actually did so as to raise the multiple testing penalty
for the subgroup that it does identify as having a side effect. In a backhanded way, this allow the drug sponsor to
look responsible – it offered up a subgroup that should not get its drug – but not actually lose any sales – the
multiple testing penalty would render the result for that subgroup insignificant. A better solution is for the FDA by
itself to conduct post hoc subgroup analysis designed to identify subgroups who do not benefit from a drug.
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Appendix
The table below summarizes the four basic options in a subgroup-identifying adaptive
design and our speculation as to the appropriate multiple-testing penalty. The rows indicate
whether interim analysis employed outcome data or not. The columns indicate whether the
sponsor added hypothesis tests after the interim analysis.
Table 1. Multiple testing penalties in adaptive trials.
Data used to identify
subgroups
Covariates (not outcomes)
Outcomes

Number of additional hypothesis tests added to study
Zero
One or more
No penalty
Penalty for adding one or more hypothesis
Must keep other subgroups in
Penalty for adding second hypothesis, must
evaluated population, plus a
keep other subgroups in evaluated population,
penalty for using outcome data
plus pay a penalty for using outcome data

If outcome data are not used to identify subgroups and no additional hypothesis tests are
added to the study, then there is no need to impose a multiple testing penalty, so long as the trial
must proceed until the sample size specified prior to starting the trial is achieved. The reason is
there was no testing of treatment effects in the interim analysis and the number of tests remain
the same as when the trial began. Even though the sponsor may choose a subgroup with low
variance with respect to covariate characteristics, so long as the data employed in the interim
analysis (patients’ baseline characteristics) are unrelated to the data relevant for estimation of the
treatment effect (patients’ treatment assignment and health outcomes), there is in essence
additional testing of treatment effects in the interim analysis. The general idea is, so long as one
analyzes a subset of the final data set that contains no information about treatment effects and
does not increase the number hypotheses to be tested, there is no multiple testing penalty for
changing the nature of the hypothesis to be tested with the final data.
If outcome data were used to identify subgroups, there should be a multiple testing
penalty even if no additional hypothesis tests were added. The reason is that the sponsor was
able to test whether treatment effects are significantly positive for a subgroup during the interim
analysis. Even with that subset of the final sample, it is highly likely that data mining would
uncover at least one subgroup with significant treatment effects in the subsample. As a result,
the sponsor would have been given the option to change the hypothesis test’s scope based on
treatment effects. It must pay a price for that.
This price is difficult to calculate since we may not know how many tests were
performed to identify a subgroup. It helps if that the IDMC conducts the interim analysis
because it has less incentive to engage in data mining and in any case is more likely truthfully to
report the number of tests performed. But if the sponsor has a role on that committee or the
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IDMC is not otherwise truly independent, institutional design may not help with calculating the
multiple-testing adjustment.81
In the cases where the sponsor adds one or more hypothesis to the study, it must pay an
additional price for multiple testing on top of the price it pays based on the data employed to
conduct the interim analysis. The reason for this penalty is obvious – the number of hypothesis
test has increased – and the size of the incremental penalty is straightforward to calculate.

81

In that case, we speculate – though have not confirmed – that requiring the sponsor to include the excluded groups
along with the newly targeted subgroup in the final analysis may address the problem that the FDA may not know
the number of tests performed in the interim analysis. Suppose, for example, that interim analysis after 10% of the
sample is enrolled reveals that only young patients have a significant treatment effect. We recommend, when the
sponsor tests the hypothesis that the treatment effect among young patients in its final empirical analysis, that the
sponsor be required to use the entire sample and not just young subjects. Specifically, the sample tested should
include the elderly patients from the initial 10% sample even though they are not nominally the subject of the
hypothesis test. Our crude logic is that the larger the number of tests performed, the worse the relative performance
of subgroups excluded from the modified hypothesis test, and the larger is the cost or penalty to the sponsor of
having to include the excluded subgroups in the final empirical analysis. Including the elderly from the 10% sample
automatically make it less likely that the sponsor will be able to show that the drug works among young patients.

30

Tables and figures

Table 2. Subgroup treatment effects in trial 0211 and trial 9801.
Trial 0211
Group

Trial 9801

n

RH

raw p-value

n

RH

raw p-value

All

554

0.78

0.1

251

0.61

0.05

PT controlled?
Yes
No

140
414

1.71
0.56

0.059
0.002

93
158

0.94
0.48

0.86
0.03

Newly diagnosed?
Yes
No

259
295

0.59
0.92

0.032
0.69

109
142

0.47
0.74

0.046
0.37

Time from BM to Tx
Tx ≤ 2 wks
2 < Tx ≤ 4 wks
Tx > 4 wks

274
161
119

0.6
0.78
1.23

0.022
0.41
0.5

119
69
63

0.78
0.63
0.33

0.5
0.29
0.09

Prior chemotherapy
No
Yes

315
239

0.67
0.91

0.06
0.66

155
96

0.57
0.72

0.07
0.42

Trail B score
Low
High

258
254

0.53
1.02

0.012
0.92

121
96

0.76
0.7

0.44
0.41

Country
USA
185
0.39
0.0048
123
0.76
0.45
Netherlands
11
5.6
0.14
54
0.38
0.074
Canada
163
0.72
0.26
46
0.4
0.14
UK
0
21
1.11
0.89
France
117
1.49
0.21
7
0.82
0.89
Germany
47
0.61
0.26
0
Notes. RH = relative hazard for MGd plus whole brain radiation therapy (WBRT) versus
WBRT. Raw p-value does not adjust for multiple testing. Trial 9801 was original Phase III
trial. Trial 0211 was second Phase III trial. PT = primary tumor. BM = brain metastases. Tx
= treatment in treatment or control group.
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Table 3. Identification of subgroups in non-outcome analysis: ratio of variance for baseline characteristics in 0211
trial versus 9801 trial.
Covariate
Ratio
p-value
Extracranial metastases?
1.73
0.0006
USA?
0.89
0.0006
PT controlled?
0.81
0.0025
Canada?
1.39
0.0068
PT resected without recurrence?
0.50
0.0137
Baseline Trail B score
1.63
0.0158
PT is large cell carcinoma?
0.60
0.0267
Days from diagnosis to randomization
5.29
0.0267
PT treated, <=1 month follow-up?
1.72
0.0554
PT is non-small-cell carcinoma?
0.80
0.1200
RPA status
0.71
0.1519
Baseline weight
1.27
0.2171
Sex
0.98
0.2171
PT has squamous histology?
0.78
0.2249
PT treated, >1 month follow-up?
0.85
0.2249
PT treated and progressing?
1.24
0.2734
PT has other histology?
1.90
0.3143
Prior chemotherapy?
1.04
0.4045
Baseline delay score
0.90
0.4045
Baseline COWA score
0.88
0.4045
Baseline Trail A score
0.59
0.4045
Baseline height
1.11
0.4075
Multiple BM lesions?
0.89
0.4154
PT newly diagnosed and/or untreated?
1.01
0.5843
Age 65+?
0.96
0.6924
Karnofsky Performance Score >= 90?
1.01
0.7010
PT is adenocarcinoma?
0.99
0.8469
Caucasian?
1.07
0.8469
Baseline recall score
0.97
0.8469
Baseline recognition score
0.98
0.9619
Other race?
1.00
0.9931
Notes. P-value adjusts for multiple testing. PT = primary tumor (i.e.,
lung cancer). BM = brain metastasis.
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Table 4. Treatment effect in 0211 trial for subgroups identified by no-outcome data analysis.
Relative hazard
p-value
Canada? No
0.82
0.3782
Canada? Yes
0.72
0.3782
Extracranial metastases? - Low
0.85
0.5467
Extracranial metastases? - High
0.71
0.2800
PT is large cell carcinoma? No
0.78
0.2800
PT is large cell carcinoma? Yes
0.90
0.8853
Days from diagnosis to randomization - Low
0.55
0.0325
Days from diagnosis to randomization - High
1.14
0.6646
USA? No
0.99
0.9500
USA? Yes
0.39
0.0325
Baseline Trail B score - Low
0.50
0.0480
Baseline Trail B score - High
0.96
0.8853
PT controlled? No
0.56
0.0320
PT controlled? Yes
1.71
0.1573
PT resected without recurrence? No
0.73
0.1536
PT resected without recurrence? Yes
3.07
0.3378
Notes. Relative hazard is for subjects on MGD and WBRT versus subjects on
WBRT only. P-value adjusts for multiple testing.
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Table 5. Identification of subgroups in split sample analysis: treatment effects in exploratory sample of 0211 trial.
Raw
Value A
Value B
Factor
p-value
Value
n
RH
p-value
Value
n
RH
p-value
france
9.11
0.027
0.0
84
0.32
0.05363
1.0
24 2.94
0.17954
pr.carbo
10.87
0.048
0.0
83
0.39
0.07833
1.0
25 4.26
0.18103
ptstagen
0.21
0.059
3.0
-1.72
0.42139
5.0
-0.37
0.07388
neurbl20
12.67
0.088
0.0
98
0.63
0.28314
1.0
10 7.99
0.14457
ltmptbm
0.20
0.098
0.0
49
1.32
0.61953
1.0
59 0.27
0.09389
sympbl12
4.67
0.100
0.0
-0.47
0.12400
2.0
-2.18
0.36172
neurbl18
0.22
0.110
5.0
-0.63
0.29587
5.0
-0.63
0.29587
basetrla
2.08
0.130
-0.3
-0.51
0.15601
2.7
-1.06
0.90295
euroaus
3.86
0.130
0.0
64
0.34
0.11599
1.0
44 1.33
0.61980
metachro
4.25
0.130
0.0
58
0.28
0.11374
1.0
50 1.19
0.73841
prior
3.66
0.140
0.0
67
0.40
0.13240
1.0
41 1.48
0.53320
neurbl21
2.44
0.150
0.0
-0.57
0.24937
1.0
-1.40
0.54303
sympbl7
4.71
0.150
0.0
-0.57
0.19931
0.0
-0.57
0.19931
prantflg
5.46
0.160
0.0
86
0.54
0.20250
1.0
22 2.97
0.33156
bmlesn
5.17
0.170
0.0
25
0.20
0.14510
1.0
83 1.01
0.98116
sympbl2
1.96
0.170
0.0
-0.47
0.16551
1.0
-0.92
0.84827
f.prrad
0.26
0.180
0.0
84
1.02
0.95880
1.0
24 0.27
0.13672
pr.csca
3.23
0.180
0.0
68
0.42
0.15428
1.0
40 1.37
0.61691
karnofsk
1.80
0.190
80.0
-0.51
0.16114
90.0
-0.92
0.85675
ltmptdx
0.28
0.190
0.0
51
1.09
0.86437
1.0
57 0.31
0.14175
neversmk
4.81
0.210
0.0
101 0.58
0.23766
1.0
7
2.80
0.37554
prantday
1.46
0.210
0.0
-0.55
0.21645
44.5
-0.80
0.62516
pbm.all
4.57
0.220
0.0
100 0.59
0.24367
1.0
8
2.68
0.39687
txgt1.4
3.57
0.220
0.0
90
0.58
0.23659
1.0
18 2.06
0.43119
controll
3.46
0.230
0.0
86
0.57
0.22919
1.0
22 1.98
0.45638
motorlbl
0.38
0.240
5.0
-0.71
0.45018
5.0
-0.71
0.45018
Notes. Value A is 0 for binary variables and the first quartile for continuous variables. Value B is 1 for binary
variables and the third quartile for continuous variables. Values are specified in the columns labeled value.
Sample size is given in columns labeled “n”. RH = relative hazard for MGd plus whole brain radiation therapy
(WBRT) versus WBRT. P-value for Value A and Value B adjusts for multiple testing. Factor gives the ratio of
variance at Value A and Value B. P-value for factor does not adjust for multiple testing.

Table 6. Distribution of p-values for "uncontrolled" subgroup treatment effects, by sample, in various sample splits.
P-value ranges
00.010.050.100.250.01
0.05
0.10
0.25
1
Total
Exploratory sample
16
19
11
19
35
100
Validation sample (raw p-values)
14
18
2
1
0
35
Validation sample (adj p-values)
2
9
9
10
4
35
Notes. First row gives distribution of p-values for “uncontrolled” subgroup across 100 sample splits after
adjusting for multiple testing. Second and third rows gives distribution of p-values in the validation sample for the
35 splits where uncontrolled group is selected in exploratory sample, i.e., adjusted p-value for uncontrolled
subgroup in exploratory sample is less than 0.05. P-values in second row do not adjust for multiple testing. Pvalues in the third row apply an overly conservative Bonferroni adjustment for multiple testing.
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